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Abstract
The paper proposes an analysis of liquid democracy (or, delegable
proxy voting) from the perspective of binary aggregation and of binary
diffusion models. We show how liquid democracy on binary issues can
be embedded into the framework of binary aggregation with abstentions,
enabling the transfer of known results about the latter—such as impossi-
bility theorems—to the former. This embedding also sheds light on the
relation between delegation cycles in liquid democracy and the probability
of collective abstentions, as well as the issue of individual rationality in a
delegable proxy voting setting. We then show how liquid democracy on
binary issues can be modeled and analyzed also as a specific process of dy-
namics of binary opinions on networks. These processes—called Boolean
DeGroot processes—are a special case of the DeGroot stochastic model of
opinion diffusion. We establish the convergence conditions of such pro-
cesses and show they provide some novel insights on how the effects of
delegation cycles and individual rationality could be mitigated within liq-
uid democracy.
The study is a first attempt to provide theoretical foundations to the
delgable proxy features of the liquid democracy voting system. Our anal-
ysis suggests recommendations on how the system may be modified to
make it more resilient with respect to the handling of delegation cycles
and of inconsistent majorities.
∗Working paper: The paper collects work presented at: Dynamics in Logic IV, TU
Delft, November 2016; seminars at the Computer Science Departments of the University of
Leicester and the University of Oxford, December 2016; Dutch Social Choice Colloquium,
December 2016. The authors wish to thank the participants of the above workshops and
seminars for many helpful suggestions. The authors wish also to thank Umberto Grandi for
many insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Both authors acknowledge
support for this research by EPSRC under grant EP/M015815/1.
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1 Introduction
Liquid democracy [2] is a form of democratic decision-making considered to
stand between direct and representative democracy. It has been used, advo-
cated and popularized by local and even national parties (e.g., Demoex1 in
Sweden, and Piratenpartei2 in Germany) to coordinate the behavior of party
representatives in assemblies, as well as campaigns (e.g., Make Your Laws3 in
the US). At its heart is voting via a delegable proxy, also called sometimes tran-
sitive proxy. For each issue submitted to vote, each agent can either cast its
own vote, or it can delegate its vote to another agent—a proxy—and that agent
can delegate in turn to yet another agent and so on. This differentiates liquid
democracy from standard proxy voting [24, 27], where proxies cannot delegate
their vote further. Finally, the agents that decided not to delegate their votes
cast their ballots (e.g., under majority rule, or adaptations thereof), but their
votes now carry a weight consisting of the number of all agents that, directly or
indirectly, entrusted them with their vote.
Scientific context and contribution Analyses of standard (non-delegable)
proxy voting from a social choice-theoretic perspective—specifically through the
theory of spatial voting—have been put forth in [1] and [17]. Delegable proxy
has not, to the best of our knowledge, been object of study so far, with the
notable exception of [6] which focuses specifically on algorithmic aspects of a
variant of liquid democracy (which the authors refer to as viscous democracy)
with applications to recommender systems.
The objective of the paper is to provide a first analysis, via formal methods,
of the liquid democracy voting system based on delegable proxy. This, we
hope, should point to a number of future lines of research and stimulate further
investigations into this and related systems.
Outline The paper starts in Section 2 by introducing some preliminaries on
the theory of binary aggregation, which is the framework of reference for this
study. It is then structured in two parts. This preliminary section presents also
novel results on binary aggregation with abstentions. The first part (Section
3) studies voting in liquid democracy from the point of view of the delegation
of voting power: we study delegable proxy aggregators using the machinery of
binary and judgment aggregation. This allows us to shed novel light on some is-
sues involved in the liquid democracy system, in particular: the issue of circular
delegation, and the issue of individual irrationality when voting on logically in-
terdependent issues. The second part (Sections 4 and 5) studies voting in liquid
democracy as a very specific type of opinion diffusion on networks, whereby del-
egation is rather interpreted as the willingness to copy the vote of a trustee. We
show that this perspective provides some interesting insights on how to address
1demoex.se/en/
2www.piratenpartei.de
3www.makeyourlaws.org
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the above mentioned issues of circular delegations and individual irrationality.
Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines some on-going lines of research.
2 Binary Aggregation with Abstention
The formalism of choice for this paper is binary aggregation [14] with absten-
tion.4 This preliminary section is devoted to its introduction.
2.1 Opinions and Opinion Profiles
A binary aggregation structure (BA structure) is a tuple A = 〈N,P, γ〉 where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a non-empty finite set individuals s.t. |N | = n ∈ N;
• P = {p1, . . . , pm} is a non-empty finite set of issues (|P| = m ∈ N), each
represented by a propositional atom;
• γ ∈ L is an (integrity) constraint, where L is the propositional language
constructed by closing P under a functionally complete set of Boolean
connectives (e.g., {¬,∧}).
An opinion function O is an assignment acceptance/rejection values (or,
truth values) to the set of issues P. Thus, O(p) = 0 (respectively, O(p) = 1) in-
dicates that opinion O rejects (respectively, accepts) the issue p. Syntactically,
the two opinions correspond to the truth of the literals p or ¬p. For p ∈ P we
write ±p to denote one element from {p,¬p}, and ±P to denote ⋃p∈P {p,¬p},
which we will refer to as the agenda of A. Allowing abstention in the frame-
work of binary aggregation amounts to considering incomplete opinions: an
incomplete opinion is a partial function from P to {0,1}. We will study it as a
function O : P → {0,1, ∗} thereby explicitly denoting the undetermined value
corresponding to abstention.
We say that the incomplete opinion of an agent i is consistent if the set of
formulas {p | Oi(p) = 1} ∪ {¬p | Oi(p) = 0} ∪ {γ} can be extended to a model
of γ (in other words, if the set is satisfiable). Intuitively, the consistency of
an incomplete opinion means that the integrity constraint is consistent with
i’s opinion on the issues she does not abstain about. We also say that an
incomplete opinion is closed whenever the following is the case: if the set of
propositional formulas {p | Oi(p) = 1}∪{¬p | Oi(p) = 0}∪{γ} logically implies
p (respectively, ¬p), then Oi(p) = 1 (respectively, Oi(p) = 0). That is, individual
opinions are closed under logical consequence or, in other words, agents cannot
abstain on issues whose acceptance or rejection is dictated by their expressed
opinions on other issues. The set of incomplete opinions is denoted O∗ and
the set of consistent and closed incomplete opinions O∗c . As the latter are the
opinions we are interested in, we will often refer to them simply as individual
opinions.
4The standard framework of binary aggregation without abstention is sketched in the
appendix for ease of reference.
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An opinion profile O = (O1, . . . , On) records the opinion, on the given set
of issues, of every individual in N . Given a profile O the ith projection O is
denoted Oi (i.e., the opinion of agent i in profile O). Let us introduce some
more notation. We also denote by O(p) = {i ∈ N | Oi(p) = 1} the set of agents
accepting issue p in profile O, by O(¬p) = {i ∈ N | Oi(p) = 0} and by O(±p) =
O(p) ∪O(¬p) the set of non-abstaining agents. We write O =−i O′ to denote
that the two profiles O and O′ are identical, except for possibly the opinion of
voter i.
2.2 Aggregators
Given a BA structure A, an aggregator (for A) is a function F : (O∗c )N → O∗,
mapping every profile of individual opinions to one collective (possibly incom-
plete) opinion.5 F (O)(p) denotes the outcome of the aggregation on issue p.
The benchmark aggregator is the issue-by-issue strict majority rule (maj), which
accepts an issue if and only if the majority of the non-abstaining voters accept
that issue:
maj(O)(p) =

1 if |O(p)| > |O(¬p)|
0 if |O(¬p)| > |O(p)|
∗ otherwise
(1)
We will refer to this rule simply as ‘majority’.
Majority can be thought of as a quota rule. In general, quota rules in
binary aggregation with abstention are of the form: accept when the proportion
of non-abstaining individuals accepting is above the acceptance-quota, reject
when the proportion of non-abstaining individuals is above the rejection-quota,
and abstain otherwise:6
Definition 1 (Quota rules). Let A be an aggregation structure. A quota rule
(for A) is defined as follows, for any issue p ∈ P, and any opinion profile
O ∈ O∗:7
F (O)(p) =

1 if |O(p)| ≥ dq1(p) · |O(±p)|e
0 if |O(¬p)| ≥ dq0(p) · |O(±p)|e
∗ otherwise
(2)
where for x ∈ {0,1}, qx is a function qx : P → (0, 1] ⊂ Q assigning a positive
rational number smaller or equal to 1 to each issue, and such that, for each
5It is therefore worth stressing that, in this paper, we study aggregators that are resolute
(that is, output exactly one value), even though they allow for collective abstention.
6There are several ways to think of quota rules in the presence of abstentions. Instead of
a quota being a proportion of non-abstaining agents, one could for instance define rules with
absolute quotas instead: accept when at least n agents accept, independently of how many
agents do not abstain. In practice, voting rules with abstention are often a combination of
those two ideas: accept an issue if a big enough proportion of the population does not abstain,
and if a big enough proportion of those accept it.
7The definition uses the ceiling function dxe denoting the smallest integer larger than x.
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p ∈ P:
qx(p) > 1− q(1−x)(p), (3)
A quota rule is called: uniform if, for all pi, pj ∈ P, qx(pi) = qx(pj); it is called
symmetric if, for all p ∈ P, q1(p) = q0(p).
Notice that the definition excludes trivial quota.8 It should also be clear
that, by (3) the above defines an aggregator of type (O∗c )N → O∗ as desired.9
Notice also that if the rule is symmetric, then (3) forces qx >
1
2 .
Example 1. The majority rule (1) is a uniform and symmetric quota rule where
q1 and q0 are set to meet the equation dq1(p) · |O(±p)|e = dq0(p) · |O(±p)|e =⌈
|O(±p)|+1
2
⌉
, for any issue p and profile O. This is achieved by setting the quota
as 12 < q1, q0 ≤ 12 + 1|N | = |N |+12|N | . More precisely one should therefore consider
maj as a class of quota rules yielding the same collective opinions.
Example 2. The uniform and symmetric unanimity rule is defined by setting
q1 = q0 = 1. A natural uniform but asymmetric variant of unanimity can be
obtained by setting q1 = 1 and q0 =
1
|N | .
Let us finally note an important difference between quota rules in binary
aggregation with abstentions vs. without abstentions. In a framework without
abstentions quota rules are normally defined by a unique acceptance quota q1,
the rejection quota being uniquely determined as q0 = 1−q1. As a consequence,
the majority rule, when |N | is odd, is the only unbiased quota rule in the
standard framework. This is no longer the case when abstentions are considered.
A novel characterization of the majority rule will be given in Section 2.5.
2.3 Agenda conditions
Definition 2 (simple/evenly negatable agenda). An agenda ±P is said to be
simple if there exists no set X ⊆ ±P such that: |X| ≥ 3, and X is minimally
γ-inconsistent, that is:
• X is inconsistent with γ
• For all Y ⊂ X, Y is consistent with γ (or, γ-consistent).
An agenda is said to be evenly negatable if there exists a minimal γ-inconsistent
set X ⊆ ±P such that for a set Y ⊆ X of even size, X\Y ∪ {¬p | p ∈ Y } is
γ-consistent. It is said to be path-connected if there exists p1, . . . , pn ∈ ±P
such that p1 |=c p2, . . . , pn−1 |=x pn where pi |=c pi+1 (conditional entailment)
denotes that there exists X ⊆ ±P, which is γ-consistent with both pi and ¬pi+1,
and such that {p} ∪X ∪ {γ} logically implies pi+1.
8Those are quotas with value 0 (always met) or > 1 (never met). Restricting to non-trivial
quota is not essential but simplifies our exposition.
9What needs to be avoided here is that both the acceptance and rejection quota are set so
low as to make the rule output both the acceptance and the rejection of a given issue
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We refer the reader to [18, Ch. 2] for a detailed exposition of the above
conditions. We provide just a simple illustrative example.
Example 3. Let P = {p, q, r} and let γ = (p ∧ q)→ r. ±P is not simple. The
set {p, q,¬r} ⊆ ±P is inconsistent with γ, but none of its subsets is.
2.4 Properties of aggregators
We start by recalling some well-known properties of aggregators from the judg-
ment aggregation literature, adapted to the setting with abstention:
Definition 3. Let A be an aggregation structure. An aggregator F : (O∗c )N →
O∗ is said to be:
unanimous iff for all p ∈ P, for all profiles O and all x ∈ {0, 1, ∗}: if for all
i ∈ N,Oi(p) = x, then F (O)(p) = x. I.e., if everybody agrees on a value,
that value is the collective value.
anonymous iff for any bijection µ : N → N , F (O) = F (Oµ), where Oµ =〈
Oµ(1), . . . , Oµ(n)
〉
. I.e., permuting opinions among individuals does not
affect the output of the aggregator.
p-dictatorial iff there exists i ∈ N (the p-dictator) s.t. for any profile O, and
all x ∈ {0,1}, Oi(p) = x iff F (O)(p) = x. I.e., there exists an agent
whose definite opinion determines the group’s definite opinion on p. If
F is p-dictatorial, with the same dictator on all issues p ∈ P, then it is
called dictatorial.
p-oligarchic iff there exists C ⊆ N (the p-oligarchs) s.t. C 6= ∅ and for any
profile O, and any value x ∈ {0,1}, F (O)(p) = x iff Oi(p) = x for all
i ∈ C. I.e., there exists a group of agents whose definite opinions always
determine the group’s definite opinion on p. If F is p-oligarchic, with the
same oligarchs on all issues p ∈ P, then it is called oligarchic.
monotonic iff, for all p ∈ P and all i ∈ N : for any profiles O,O′, if O =−i
O′: (i) if Oi(p) 6= 1 and O′i(p) ∈ {1, ∗}, then: if F (O)(p) = 1, then
F (O′)(p) = 1; and (ii) if Oi(p) 6= 0 and O′i(p) ∈ {0, ∗}, then: if F (O)(p) =
0, then F (O′)(p) = 0. I.e., increasing support for a definite collective
opinion does not change that collective opinion.
independent iff, for all p ∈ P, for any profiles O,O′: if for all i ∈ N,Oi(p) =
O′i(p), then F (O)(p) = F (O
′)(p). I.e., the collective opinion on each issue
is determined only by the individual opinions on that issue.
neutral iff, for all p, q ∈ P, for any profile O: if for all i ∈ N , Oi(p) = Oi(q),
then F (O)(p) = F (O)(q). I.e., all issues are aggregated in the same
manner.
systematic iff it is neutral and independent. I.e., the collective opinion on
issue p depends only on the individual opinions on this issue.
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responsive iff for all p ∈ P, there exist profiles O,O′ such that F (O)(p) = 1
and F (O′)(p) = 0. I.e., the rule allows for an issue to be accepted for
some profile, and rejected for some other.
unbiased iff for all p ∈ P, for any profiles O,O′ : if for all i ∈ N , Oi(p) = 1 iff
O′i(p) = 0 (we say that O
′ is the “reversed” profile of O), then F (O)(p) =
1 iff F (O′)(p) = 0. I.e., reversing all and only individual opinions on
an issue p (from acceptance to rejection and from rejection to acceptance)
results in reversing the collective opinion on p.
rational iff for any profile O, F (O) is consistent and closed. I.e., the aggre-
gator preserves the constraints on individual opinions.
Example 4. It is well-known that majority is not rational in general. The
standard example is provided by the so-called discursive dilemma, represented
by the BA structure 〈{1, 2, 3} , {p, q, r} , r ↔ (p ∧ q)〉. The profile consisting of
O1 |= p ∧ q ∧ r, O2 |= p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬r, O3 |= ¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r, returns an inconsistent
majority opinion maj(O) |= p ∧ q ∧ ¬r (cf. [18]).
Finally, let us defined also the following property. The undecisiveness of
an aggregator F on issue p for a given aggregation structure is defined as the
number of profiles which result in collective abstention on p:
u(F )(p) = | {O ∈ O∗c | F (O)(p) = ∗} |. (4)
2.5 Characterizing quota rules
As a typical example, consider the aggregator maj: it is unanimous, anonymous,
monotonic, systematic, responsive and unbiased, but, as mentioned above, it
is not rational in general. However, it can be shown (cf. [18, 3.1.1]) that
aggregation by majority is collectively rational under specific assumptions on
the constraint:
Fact 1. Let A be a BA structure with a simple agenda. Then maj is rational.
Proof. If the agenda ±P is simple, then all minimally inconsistent sets have
cardinality 2, that is, are of the form {ϕ,¬ϕ} such that ϕ |= ¬ϕ for ϕ,ψ ∈ P.
W.l.o.g. assume ϕ = pi and ψ = pj . Suppose towards a contradiction that
there exists a profile O such that maj(O) is inconsistent, that is, maj(O)(pi) =
maj(O)(pj) = 1, and ϕ |= ¬ψ. By the definition of maj (1) it follows that
|O(pi)| > |O(¬pi)| and |O(pj)| > |O(¬pj)|. Since pi |= ¬pj by assumption,
and since individual opinions are consistent and closed, |O(¬pj)| ≥ |O(pi)| and
|O(¬pi)| ≥ |O(pj)|. From the fact that |O(pi)| > |O(¬pi)| we can thus conclude
that |O(¬pj)| > |O(pj)|. Contradiction.
May’s theorem [23] famously shows that for preference aggregation, the ma-
jority rule is in fact the only aggregator satisfying a specific bundle of desirable
properties. A corresponding characterization of the majority rule is given in
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judgment aggregation without abstention: when the agenda is simple, the ma-
jority rule is the only aggregator which is rational, anonymous, monotonic and
unbiased [18, Th. 3.2]. We give below a novel characterization theorem, which
takes into account the possibility of abstention (both at the individual and at
the collective level). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result of this
kind in the literature on judgment and binary aggregation with abstention.
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let F be a uniform and symmetric quota rule for a given A. The
following holds: 12 < q1 = q0 ≤ |N |+12|N | if and only if F = arg minG u(G)(p), for
all p ∈ P.
Proof. The claim is proven by the following series of equivalent statements.
(a) A uniform and symmetric quota rule F has quota such that 12 < q1 =
q0 ≤ |N |+12|N | . (b) A uniform and symmetric quota rule F has quota such that
dq1(p)|O(±p)|e = dq0(p)|O(±p)|e =
⌈
|O(±p)|+1
2
⌉
for any profile O and issue p.
(c) For any O ∈ O∗c and p ∈ P, u(O)(p) = ∗ if and only if O(p) = O(¬p),
that is, an even number of voters vote and the group is split in half. (d) F =
arg minG u(G)(p), for all p ∈ P.
That is, the quota rule(s) corresponding to the majority rule (Example 1) is
precisely the rule that minimizes undecisiveness.
We can now state and prove the characterization result:
Theorem 1. Let F : (O∗c )N → O∗ be an aggregator for a given A. The following
holds:
1. F is a quota rule if and only if it is anonymous, independent, monotonic,
and responsive;
2. F is a uniform quota rule if and only if it is a neutral quota rule;
3. F is a symmetric quota rule if and only if it is an unbiased quota rule;
4. F is the majority rule maj if and only if it is a uniform symmetric quota
rule which minimizes undecisiveness.
Proof. Claim 1 Left-to-right: Easily checked. Right-to-left: Let F be an
anonymous, independent, monotonic, and responsive aggregator. By anonymity
and independence, for any p ∈ P, and any O ∈ O∗c , the only information deter-
mining the value of F (O)(p) are the integers |O(p)| and |O(¬p)|.
By responsiveness, there exists a non-empty set of profiles S1 = {O ∈
O∗|F (O)(p) = 1}. Pick O to be any profile in S1 with a minimal value of
|O(p)|
|O(±p)| and call this value q1. Now let O
′ be any profile such that O′ =−i O and
|O′(p)|
|O′(±p)| > q1. This implies that Oi(p) = 0 and O
′
i(p) = 1. By monotonicity, it
follows that F (O′)(p) = 1. By iterating this argument a finite number of times
we conclude that whenever |O(p)||O(±p)| ≥ q1, we have that F (O)(p) = 1. Given
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that q1 was defined as a minimal value, we conclude also that if F (O)(p) = 1,
then O(p)O(p±) ≥ q1. The argument for q0 is identical.
Claims 2 & 3 follow straightforwardly from the definitions of uniform quota
rule (Definition 1) and of neutrality (Definition 3) and, respectively, from the
definitions of symmetric quota rules (Definition 1) and of unbiasedness (Defini-
tion 3) .
Claim 4 Left-to-right. Recall that maj is defined by quota 12 < q1 = q0 ≤
1
2 +
1
|N | (Example 1). It is clear that maj is uniform and symmetric. The claim
then follows by Lemma 1. Right-to-left. By Lemma 1 if an aggregator minimizes
undecisiveness then its quota are set as 12 < q1 = q0 ≤ 12 + 1|N | . These quota
define maj (Example 1).
By the above theorem and Fact 1, it follows that, on simple agendas, majority
is the only rational aggregator which is also responsive, anonymous, systematic
and monotonic.
2.6 Impossibility in Binary Aggregation with Abstentions
The following is a well-know impossibility result concerning binary aggregation
with abstentions:
Theorem 2 ([11, 10]). Let A be a BA structure whose agenda is path connected
and evenly negatable. Then if an aggregator F : (O∗c )N → O∗ is independent,
unanimous and collectively rational, then it is oligarchic.
We will use this result to illustrate how impossibility results from binary
aggregation with abstentions apply to delegable proxy voting on binary issues.
3 Liquid Democracy as Binary Aggregation
In this section we provide an analysis of liquid democracy by embedding it in the
theory of binary aggregation with abstentions presented in the previous section.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at providing an analysis
of delegable proxy voting using social-choice theoretic tools, with the possible
exception of [16].
In what follows we will often refer to delegable proxy voting/aggregation
simply as proxy voting/aggregation.
3.1 Binary Aggregation via Delegable Proxy
In binary aggregation with proxy, agents either express an acceptance/rejection
opinion or delegate such opinion to a different agent.
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3.1.1 Proxy Opinions and Profiles
Let a BA structure A be given and assume for now that γ = >, that is, all issues
are logically independent. An opinion O : P → {0,1} ∪N is an assignment of
either a truth value or another agent to each issue in P, such that Oi(p) 6= i
(that is, self-delegation is not an expressible opinion). We will later also require
proxy opinion to be individually rational, in a precise sense (Section 3.2.2). For
simplicity we are assuming that abstention is not a feasible opinion in proxy
voting, but that is an assumption that can be easily lifted in what follows.
We call functions of the above kind proxy opinions to distinguish them from
standard (binary) opinions, and we denote by P the set of all proxy opinions, Pc
the set of all consistent proxy opinions, PN being the set of all proxy profiles.
3.1.2 Delegation Graphs
Each profile O of proxy opinions (proxy profile in short) induces a delegation
graph GO = 〈N, {Rp}p∈P〉 where for i, j ∈ N :
iRpj ⇐⇒
{
Oi(p) = j if i 6= j
Oi(p) ∈ {0,1} otherwise (5)
The expression iRpj stands for “i delegates her vote to j on issue p”. Each Rp
is a so-called functional relation. It corresponds to the graph of an endomap on
N . So we will sometimes refer to the endomap rp : N → N of which Rp is the
graph. Relations Rp have a very specific structure and can be thought of as a
set of trees whose roots all belong to cycles (possibly loops).
The weight of an agent i w.r.t. p in a delegation graph GO is given by its
indegree with respect to R∗p (i.e., the reflexive and transitive closure of Rp):
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wOi (p) = |
{
j ∈ N | jR∗pi
} |. This definition of weight makes sure that each indi-
vidual carries the same weight, independently of the structure of the delegation
graph. Alternative definitions of weight are of course possible and we will come
back to this issue later.11
For all p ∈ P, we also define the function gp : N → ℘(N) such that gp(i) ={
j ∈ N | jR∗pi and @k : jRpk
}
. The function associates to each agent i (for a
given issue p), the (singleton consisting of the) last agent reachable from i via a
path of delegation on issue p, when it exists (and ∅ otherwise). Slightly abusing
notation we will use gp(i) to denote an agent, that is, the guru of i over p when
gp(i) 6= ∅. If gp(i) = {i} we call i a guru for p. Notice that gp(i) = {i} iff
rp(i) = i, that is, i is a guru of p iff it is a fixpoint of the endomap rp.
If the delegation graph GO of a proxy profile O is such that, for some Rp,
there exists no i ∈ N such that i is a guru of p, we say that graph GO (and
profile O) is void on p. Intuitively, a void profile on p is a profile where no voter
expresses an opinion on p, because every voter delegates her vote to somebody
else.
10 We recall that the reflexive transitive closure R∗ of a binary relation R ⊆ N2 is the
smallest reflexive and transitive relation that contains R.
11See also footnote 15 below.
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Given a BA structure A, a proxy aggregation rule (or proxy aggregator) for
A is a function pv : PN → O∗ that maps every proxy profile to one collective
incomplete opinion. As above, pv(O)(p) denotes the outcome of the aggregation
on issue p.
3.1.3 Proxy Aggregators
The most natural form of voting via delegable proxy is a proxy version of the
majority rule we discussed in Section 2:12
pvmaj(O)(p) =

1 if
∑
i∈O(p) w
O
i (p) >
∑
i∈O(¬p) w
O
i (p)
0 if
∑
i∈O(¬p) w
O
i (p) >
∑
i∈O(p) w
O
i (p)
∗ otherwise
(6)
That is, an issue is accepted by proxy majority in profile O if the sum of
the weights of the agents who accept p in O exceeds the majority quota, it
is rejected if the sum of the weights of the agents who reject p in O exceeds
the majority quota, and it is undecided otherwise. It should be clear that∑
i∈O(p) w
O
i (p) = |{i ∈ N |Ogi(p) = 1}| (and similarly for ¬p), that is, the sum
of the weights of the gurus accepting (rejecting) p is precisely the cardinality of
the set of agents whose gurus accept (reject) p.
In general, it should be clear that for any quota rule F : O∗c → O∗ a proxy
variant pvF of F can be defined via an obvious adaptation of (6).
To fix intuitions further about proxy voting it is worth discussing another
example of aggregator, proxy dictatorship. It is defined as follows, for a given
d ∈ N (the dictator) any proxy profile O and issue p:
pvd(O)(p) =
{
Ogp(d) if gp(d) 6= ∅
∗ otherwise (7)
That is, in a proxy dictatorship, the collective opinion is the opinion of the guru
of the dictator, when it exists, and it is undefined otherwise.
3.2 Two Issues of Delegable Proxy
3.2.1 Cycles and Abstentions
It should be clear from the definition of proxy aggregators like pvmaj, that such
aggregators rely on the existence of gurus in the underlying delegation graphs.
If the delegation graph Rp on issue p contains no guru, then the aggregator has
access to no information in terms of who accepts and who rejects issue p. To
avoid bias in favor of acceptance or rejection, such situations should therefore
result in an undecided collective opinion. That is for instance the case of pvmaj.
However, such situations may well be considered problematic, and the natural
question arises therefore of how likely they are, at least in principle.
12On the importance of majority decisions in the current implementation of liquid democ-
racy by liquid feedback cf. [2, p.106].
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Fact 2. Let A be a BA structure where γ = > (i.e., issues are independent).
If each proxy profile is equally probable (impartial culture assumption), then the
probability that, for each issue p, the delegation graph Rp has no gurus tends to
1
e2 as n tends to infinity.
Proof. The claim amounts to computing the probability that a random proxy
profile O induces a delegation graph Rp that does not contain gurus (or equiv-
alently, whose endomap rp : N → N has no fixpoints) as n tends to infinity.
Now, for each agent i, the number of possible opinions on a given issue p (that
is, functions O : {p} → {0,1}∪N) is |(N\ {i})∪{0,1} | = n+1 (recall i cannot
express “i” as an opinion). The number of opinions in which i is delegating
her vote is n− 1. So, the probability that a random opinion of i about p is an
opinion delegating i’s vote is n−1n+1 . Hence the probability that a random profile
consists only of delegated votes (no gurus) is (n−1n+1 )
n. The claimed value is then
established through this series of equations:
lim
n→∞
(
n− 1
n
)n
= lim
n→∞
(
n
n+ 2
)n
= lim
n→∞
(
1
n+2
n
)n
= lim
n→∞
(
1
1 + 2n
)n
= lim
n→∞
(
1
(1 + 2n )
n
)
=
1
limn→∞(1 + 2n )
n
=
1
e2
This completes the proof.
Now contrast the above simple fact with the probability that all agents
abstain on an issue when each voter either expresses a 1 or 0 opinion or abstains
(that is, the binary aggregation with abstentions setting studied earlier). In that
case the probability that everybody abstains tends to 0 as n tends to infinity.
Fact 2 should obviously not be taken as a realistic estimate of the effect of
cycles on collective abstention, as the impartial culture assumption is a highly
idealized assumption. Election data should ideally be used to assess whether del-
egation cycles ever lead large parts of the electorate to ’lose their vote’, possibly
together with refinements of the above argument that take into consideration
realistic distributions on proxy profiles, and therefore realistic delegation struc-
tures. Nonetheless, Fact 2 does flag a potential problem of cyclical delegations
as sources of abstention which has, to the best of our knowledge, never been
discussed. The mainstream position on cyclical delegations [2, Section 2.4.1]
is:13
13Cf. also [3].
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“The by far most discussed issue is the so-called circular delegation
problem. What happens if the transitive delegations lead to a cycle,
e.g. Alice delegates to Bob, Bob delegates to Chris, and Chris del-
egates to Alice? Would this lead to an infinite voting weight? Do
we need to take special measures to prohibit such a situation? In
fact, this is a nonexistent problem: A cycle only exists as long as
there is no activity in the cycle in which case the cycle has no effect.
As already explained [. . . ], as soon as somebody casts a vote, their
(outgoing) delegation will be suspended. Therefore, the cycle natu-
rally disappears before it is used. In our example: If Alice and Chris
decide to vote, then Alice will no longer delegate to Bob, and Chris
will no longer delegate to Alice [. . . ]. If only Alice decides to vote,
then only Alice’s delegation to Bob is suspended and Alice would
use a voting weight of 3. In either case the cycle is automatically
resolved and the total voting weight used is 3.”
We will discuss later (Section 4) a possible approach to mitigate this issue
by suggesting a different interpretation of liquid democracy in terms of influence
rather than delegation.
3.2.2 Individual & Collective Rationality
In our discussion so far we have glossed over the issue of logically interdepen-
dent issues and collective rationality. The reason is that under the delegative
interpretation of liquid democracy developed in this section individual ratio-
nality itself appears to be a more debatable requirement than it normally is in
classical aggregation.
A proxy opinion Oi is individually rational if the set of formulas
{γ} ∪ {p ∈ P | Ogp(i)(p) = 1} ∪ {¬p ∈ P | Ogp(i)(p) = 0} (8)
is satisfiable (consistency), and if whenever (8) entails ±p, then ±p belongs to it
(closedness).14 That is, the integrity constraint γ is consistent with i’s opinion
on the issues she does not delegate on, and the opinions of her gurus (if they
exist), and those opinions, taken together, are closed under logical consequence
(w.r.t. the available issues).
The constraint in (8) captures, one might say, an idealized way of how del-
egation works: voters are assumed to be able to check or monitor how their
gurus are voting, and always modify their delegations if an inconsistency arises.
The constraint remains, however, rather counterintuitive under a delegative in-
terpretation of proxy voting. Aggregation via delegable proxy has at least the
potential to represent individual opinions as irrational (inconsistent and/or not
logically closed).
Like in the case of delegation cycles we will claim that the interpretation of
liquid democracy in terms of influence to be developed in Section 4, rather than
14Cf. the definition of individual opinions in Section 2.
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in terms of delegation, makes individual rationality at least as defensible as in
the classical case.
3.3 Embedding in Binary Aggregation with Abstentions
3.3.1 One man—One vote
Aggregation in liquid democracy as conceived in [2] should satisfy the principle
that the opinion of every voter, whether expressed directly or through proxy,
should be given the same weight:
“[. . . ] in fact every eligible voter has still exactly one vote [. . . ] unre-
stricted transitive delegations are an integral part of Liquid Democ-
racy. [. . . ] Unrestricted transitive delegations are treating delegat-
ing voters and direct voters equally, which is most democratic and
empowers those who could not organize themselves otherwise” [2,
p.34-36]
In other words, this principle suggests that aggregation via delegable proxy
should actually be ‘blind’ for the specific type of delegation graph. Making
this more formal, we can think of the above principle as suggesting that the
only relevant content of a proxy profile is its translation into a standard opinion
profile (with abstentions) via a function t : P → O∗ defined as follows: for
any i ∈ N and p ∈ P: t(Oi(p)) = Ogp(i) if gp(i) 6= ∅ (i.e., if i has a guru
for p), and t(Oi(p)) = ∗ otherwise. Clearly, if we assume proxy profiles to be
individually rational, the translation will map proxy opinions into individually
rational (consistent and closed) incomplete opinions. By extension, we will
denote by t(O) the incomplete opinion profile resulting from translating the
individual opinions of a proxy profile O.
The above discussion suggests the definition of the following property of
proxy aggregators: a proxy aggregator pv has the one man–one vote prop-
erty (or is a one man—one vote aggregator) if and only if pv = t ◦ F for
some aggregator F : O∗c → O∗ (assuming the individual rationality of proxy
profiles).15
The class of one man—one vote aggregators can therefore be studied simply
as the concatenation t ◦ F where F is an aggregator for binary voting with
abstentions, as depicted in the following diagram:
15It should be clear that not every proxy aggregator satisfies this property. By means of
example, consider an aggregator that uses the following notion of weight accrued by gurus in
a delegation graph. The weight w(i) of i is
∑
j∈R∗(i)
1
`(i,j)
where `(i, j) denotes the length
of the delegation path linking j to i. This definition of weight is such that the contribution
of voters decreases as their distance from the guru increases. Aggregators of this type are
studied in [6].
15
O t(O)
F (t(O))
t
pvF F
which gives us a handle to study a large class of proxy voting rules
Example 5. Proxy majority pvmaj (6) is clearly a one man—one vote rule ag-
gregator. It is easy to check that, for any proxy profile O: pvmaj(O) = maj(t(O)).
The same holds for proxy dictatorship (7). It is easy to see that proxy dictator-
ship pvd is such that for any proxy profile O: pvd(O) = d(t(O)), where d is the
standard dictatorship (of d ∈ N).
It follows that for every proxy aggregator pvF = t ◦ F the axiomatic ma-
chinery developed for standard aggregators can be directly tapped into. Char-
acterization results then extend effortlessly to proxy voting, again providing a
strong rationale for the use of majority in proxy aggregation:
Fact 3 (Characterization of proxy majority). A one man—one vote proxy ag-
gregator pv = t ◦ F for a given A is proxy majority pvmaj iff F is anonymous,
independent, monotonic, responsive, neutral and minimizes undecisiveness.
Proof. This follows from the definition of t and Theorem 1.
It follows that on simple agendas and assuming the individual rationality of
proxy profiles, proxy majority is the only rational aggregator which is anony-
mous, independent, monotonic, responsive, neutral and minimizes undecisive-
ness.
3.3.2 Impossibility
Similarly, there are many ways in which pursue the opposite embedding, from
standard aggregation into proxy voting. For example, we can define a func-
tion s : Oc → Pc from opinion profiles to individually rational proxy profiles
as follows. For a given opinion profile O, and issue p ∈ P consider the set
{i ∈ N | Oi(p) = ∗} of individuals that abstain in O and take an enumeration
1, . . . ,m of its elements, where m = | {i ∈ N | Oi(p) = ∗} |. The function is de-
fined as follows, for any i ∈ N and p ∈ P: s(Oi(p)) = Oi(p) if Oi(p) ∈ {0,1},
s(Oi(p)) = i+1 mod m, otherwise.
16 A translation of this type allows to think
of standard aggregators F : O∗c → O∗ as the concatenation s ◦ pv, for some
proxy aggregator pv:
16Notice that since self-delegation (that is, Oi(p) = i) is not feasible in proxy opinions, this
definition of s works for profiles where, on each issue, either nobody abstains or at least two
individuals abstain. A dummy voter can be introduced for that purpose.
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O s(O)
pv(s(O))
pvFpv
s
Fact 4. Let A be such that its agenda is path connected and evenly negatable.
For any proxy aggregator pv, if s◦pv is independent, unanimous and collectively
rational, then it is oligarchic.
Proof. It follows directly from the definition of s and Theorem 2.
3.4 Section Summary
The section has provided a very simple model of delegable proxy voting within
the framework of binary aggregation. This has allowed us to put liquid democ-
racy in perspective with an established body of results in the social choice
theory tradition, and highlight two of its problematic aspects, which have so far
gone unnoticed: the effect of cycles on collective indecisiveness, and the issue of
preservation of individual rationality under delegable proxies.
An independent, purpose-built axiomatic analysis for liquid democracy fo-
cused on its more characteristic features (like the one man—one vote property)
is a natural line of research, which we do not pursue here.
4 Liquid Democracy as Binary Opinion Diffu-
sion
Proxy voting can also be studied from a different perspective. Imagine a group
where, for each issue p, each agent copies the 0,1 opinion of a unique personal
“guru”. Imagine that this group does so repeatedly until all agents (possibly)
reach a stable opinion. These new stable opinions can then be aggregated as
the ‘true’ opinions of the individuals in the group. The collective opinion of a
group of agents who either express a 0,1 opinion or delegate to another agent
is (for one man—one vote proxy aggregators) the same as the output obtained
from a vote where each individual has to express a 0,1 opinion but gets there
by copying the opinion of some unique “guru” (possibly themselves). In this
perspective, a proxy voting aggregation can be assimilated to a (converging)
process of opinion formation.
The above interpretation of liquid democracy is explicitly put forth in [2]:
“While one way to describe delegations is the transfer of voting
weight to another person, you can alternatively think of delegations
as automated copying of the ballot of a trustee. While at assemblies
with voting by a show of hands it is naturally possible to copy the
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vote of other people, in Liquid Democracy this becomes an intended
principle” [2, p. 22].
The current section develops an analysis of this interpretation, and highlights
some of its advantages over the delegation-based one studied earlier.
4.1 Binary aggregation and binary influence
The section develops a very simple model of binary influence based on the stan-
dard framework of binary aggregation (see Appendix B for a concise presenta-
tion). For simplicity, in this section we assume agents are therefore not allowed
to abstain, although this is not a crucial assumption for the development of our
analysis.
4.1.1 DeGroot Processes and Opinion Diffusion
In [9], DeGroot proposes a simple model of step-by-step opinion change under
social influence. The model combines two types of matrices. Assuming a group
of n agents, a first n×n matrix represents the weighted influence network (who
influences whom and how much), and a second n × m matrix represents the
probability assigned by each agent to each of the m different alternatives. Both
the agents’ opinion and the influence weights are taken within [0, 1] and are
(row) stochastic (each row sums up to 1). Given an opinion and an influence
matrix, the opinion of each agent in the next time step is obtained through
linear averaging.
Here we focus on a specific class of opinion diffusion processes in which
opinions are binary, and agents are influenced by exactly one influencer, possibly
themselves, of which they copy the opinion. The model captures a class of
processes which lies at the interface of two classes of diffusion models that have
remained so far unrelated: the stochastic opinion diffusion model known as
DeGroot’s [9], and the more recent propositional opinion diffusion model due to
[15]. The diffusion processes underpinning liquid democracy—which we call here
Boolean DeGroot processes (BDPs)—are the {0, 1} special case of the DeGroot
stochastic processes and, at the same time, the special case of propositional
opinion diffusion processes where each agent has access to the opinion of exactly
one neighbor (cf. Figure 1).
4.1.2 Boolean DeGroot processes
Here we focus on the Boolean special case of a DeGroot process showing its
relevance for the analysis of liquid democracy. Opinions are defined over a BA
structure, and hence are taken to be binary. Similarly, we take influence to
be modeled by the binary case of an influence matrix. Influence is of an “all-
or-nothing” type and each agent is therefore taken to be influenced by exactly
one agent, possibly itself. The graph induced by such a binary influence matrix
(called influence graph) is therefore a structure G = 〈N,R〉 where R ⊆ N2 is
a binary relation where iRj is taken here to denote that “i is influenced by j”.
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BDPs
DeGroot Processes
Propositional Opinion Diffusion
Figure 1: BDPs lie in the intersection of DeGroot processes and propositional
opinion diffusion processes.
Such relation is serial (∀i ∈ N, ∃j ∈ N : iRj) and functional (∀i, j, k ∈ N if iRj
and iRk then j = k). So each agent i has exactly one successor (the influencer),
possibly itself, which we denote R(i). It should be clear that influence graphs
are the same sort of structures we studied earlier in Section 3 under the label
’delegation graph’.
An influence profile G = (G1, . . . , Gm) records how each agent is influenced
by each other agent, with respect to each issue p ∈ P. Given a profile G the ith
projection Gi denotes the influence graph for issue pi, also written Gp.
So let us define the type of opinion dynamics driving BDPs:
Definition 4 (BDP). Now fix an opinion profile O and an influence profile G.
Consider the stream O0,O1, . . . ,On, . . . of opinion profiles recursively defined
as follows:
• Base: O0 := O
• Step: for all i ∈ N , p ∈ P, On+1i (p) := OnRp(i)(p).
where Gp = 〈N,Rp〉. We call processes defined by the above dynamics Boolean
DeGroot processes (BDPs).
It should be clear that the above dynamics is the extreme case of linear
averaging applied on binary opinions and binary influence.
As noted above, BDPs are also the special case of processes that have recently
been proposed in the multi-agent systems literature as propositional opinion
diffusion processes [15], i.e., cases where 1) the aggregation rule is the unanimity
rule (an agent adopts an opinion if and only if all her influencers agree on it),
and 2) each agent has exactly one influencer. We will come back to the link
with propositional opinion diffusion in some more detail later in Section 4.3.
4.2 Convergence of BDPs
When do the opinions of a group of individuals influencing each other stabi-
lize? Conditions have been given, in the literature, for the general paradigms
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of which BDPs are limit cases. This section introduces the necessary graph-
theoretic notions and briefly recalls those results before giving a characterization
of convergence for BDPs.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
We start with some terminology. We say that the stream of opinion profiles
O0,O1, . . . ,On, . . . converges if there exists n ∈ N such that for all m ∈ N, if
m ≥ n, then Om = On.
We will also say that a stream of opinion profiles converges for issue p if there
exists n ∈ N such that, for all m ∈ N, if m ≥ n, then Om(p) = On(p). Given
a stream of opinion profiles starting at O we say that agent i ∈ N stabilizes
in that stream for issue p if there exists n ∈ N such that Oni (p) = Omi (p) for
any m > n. So a BDP on influence graph G starting with the opinion profile
O is said to converge if the stream O0,O1, . . . ,On, . . . generated according to
Definition 4 where O = O0 converges. Similarly, A BDP is said to converge
for issue p if its stream converges for p, and an agent i in the BDP is said to
stabilize for p if it stabilizes for p in the stream generated by the BDP.
Notice first of all that influence graphs have a special shape:17
Fact 5. Let G be an influence graph and C be a connected component of G.
Then C contains exactly one cycle, and the set of nodes in the cycle is closed.
Proof. Assume that C does not contain any cycle. Since N is finite and since no
path can repeat any node, any path in C is finite too. Let i be the last element
of (one of) the longest path(s) in C. Then i does not have any successor, which
contradicts seriality. So C contains at least one cycle. Let S be the set of nodes
of a cycle in C. Assume that S is not closed: for some i ∈ S and j /∈ S, iRj.
Since S is a cycle, there is also some k ∈ S, such that iRk, which contradicts
functionality. Therefore, the nodes of any cycle in C forms a closed set. Now
assume that C contains more than one cycle. Since the nodes of each cycle forms
a closed set, there is no path connecting any node inside a cycle to any node in
any other cycle, which contradicts connectedness. So C contains a unique cycle,
whose nodes form a closed set.
Intuitively, influence graphs of BDPs then look like sets of confluent chains
aiming together towards common cycles.
4.2.2 Context: convergence in DeGroot processes
For the general case of DeGroot processes, an influence structure guarantees that
any distribution of opinions will converge if and only if “every set of nodes that
is strongly connected and closed is aperiodic” [20, p.233]. In the propositional
opinion diffusion setting, sufficient conditions for stabilization have been given
by [15, Th. 2]: on influence structures containing cycles of size at most one
17Please consult Appendix B for the relevant terminology from graph theory.
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(i.e, only self-loops), for agents using an aggregation function satisfying (ballot-
)monotonicity and unanimity18, opinions will always converge in at most at
most k + 1 steps, where k is the diameter of the graph.19 The results below
show how BDPs are an interesting limit case of both DeGroot and propositional
opinion diffusion processes.
4.2.3 Two results
It must be intuitively clear that non-convergence in a BDP is linked to the
existence of cycles in the influence graphs. However, from the above observation
(Fact 5), we know that nodes in a cycle cannot have any influencers outside this
cycle, and hence that cycles (including self-loops) can only occur at the “tail” of
the influence graph. Hence, if the opinions in the (unique) cycle do not converge,
which can only happen in a cycle of length ≥ 2, the opinions of the whole
population in the same connected component will not converge. The above
implies that for any influence graphs with a cycle of length ≥ 2, there exists a
distribution of opinions which loops. This brings us back to convergence result
for general (not necessarily Boolean) DeGroot processes. Indeed, for functional
and serial influence graphs, a closed connected component is aperiodic if and
only if its cycle is of length 1.
Fact 6. Let G be an influence profile. Then the following are equivalent:
1. The BDP converges for any opinion profile O on G.
2. For all p ∈ P, Gp contains no cycle of length ≥ 2.
3. For all p ∈ P, all closed connected components of Gp are aperiodic.
Proof. 2)⇒ 1) Let p ∈ P and assume that Gp contains no cycle of length
≥ 2 and has diameter k. Let Cp be a connected component of Gp. By Fact 5,
Cp contains a unique cycle, which, by assumption, is of length 1. Hence, Cp
is aperiodic. Let i be the node in the cycle. The opinion of i will spread to
all nodes in Cp after at most k steps. Therefore, all BDPs on G will converge
after at most l steps, where l is the maximum within the set of diameters of
Gp for all p ∈ P. 1)⇒ 3) We proceed by contraposition. Assume that for
some p ∈ P, a connected component Cp of Gp contains a cycle of length k ≥ 2.
By 5, this cycle is unique, and therefore the greatest common divisor of the
cycles lengths of Cp is k, so Cp is not aperiodic. Let S be the set of nodes in
the cycle. Let O be such that for some i, j ∈ S with distance d from i to j,
Oi(p) 6= Oj(p). Then Oi(p) will not converge, but enter a loop of size k: for
18Notice that the rule underpinning BDP, that is the ‘guru-copying’ rule on serial and
functional graphs, trivially satisfies those constraints.
19A second sufficient condition for convergence is given by [15]: when agents use the una-
nimity aggregation rule, on irreflexive graphs with only vertex-disjoint cycles, such that for
each cycle there exists an agent who has at least two influencers, opinions converge after at
most N steps. Note that no BDP satisfies this second condition.
21
all x ∈ N, Ox×ki (p) 6= O(x×k)+di (p). Hence, O does not converge. 3)⇒ 2)
Trivial.
It is worth noticing that one direction (namely from 3 to 1) of the above
result is actually a corollary of both the convergence result for DeGroot processes
stated at the beginning of this section (cf. [20]), and of a known convergence
result for propositional opinion diffusion [15, Th. 2], also stated earlier.
The above gives a characterization of the class of influence profiles on which
all opinion streams converge. But we can aim at a more general result, charac-
terizing the class of pairs of opinion and influence profiles which lead to conver-
gence:
Theorem 3. Let G be an influence profile and O be an opinion profile. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
1. The BDP converges for O on G.
2. For all p ∈ P, there is no set of agents S ⊆ N such that: S is a cycle in
Gp and there are two agents i, j ∈ S such that Oi(p) 6= Oj(p).
Proof. 1)⇒ 2) We proceed by contraposition. Let p ∈ P, S ⊆ N be a cycle
in Gp, i, j ∈ S, and Oi(p) 6= Oj(p). Let k be the length of the cycle and d be
the distance from i to j. Then Oi(p) will enter a loop of size k: for all x ∈ N,
Oxki (p) 6= Oxk+di (p). 2)⇒ 1) Assume S ⊆ N be such that S is a cycle in
Gp, and for all i, j ∈ S, Oi(p) = Oj(p). Then, for all j ∈ S, and all x ∈ N,
Oxj (p) = Oi(p) and for all f ∈ N /∈ S with distance d from f to i, for all x ∈ N,
such that x ≥ d, Oxf (p) = Oi(p).
This trivially implies that the class of opinion profiles which guarantees con-
vergence for any influence profile, is the one where everybody agrees on every-
thing already. Note that the only stable distributions of opinions are the ones
where, in each connected component in G, all members have the same opinion,
i.e, on BDPs, converging and reaching a consensus (within each connected com-
ponent) are equivalent, unlike in the stochastic case. Moreover, for an influence
profile where influence graphs have at most diameter d and the smallest cycle in
components with diameter d is of length c, it is easy to see that if a consensus
is reached, it will be reached in at most d− c steps, which is at most n− 1.
Finally observe that Theorem 3 subsumes Fact 6. If Gp contains only cycles
of length 1 (second statement in Fact 6) then, trivially, no two agents in a cycle
can disagree (second statement in Theorem 3).
4.2.4 Liquid Democracy as a BDP
We have seen (Section 3) that each proxy profile O induces what we called a
delegation graph GO = 〈N,Rp〉 for each issue p. Delegation graphs are the same
sort of structures we referred to in the current section as influence graphs. So
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each proxy profile O can be associated to a BDP by simply assigning random
0 or 1 opinions to each voter delegating her vote in O. It is then easy to show
that for each connected component C of GO, if C has a guru with opinion x,
then that component stabilizes in the BDP on opinion x for each assignment
of opinions to the delegating agents in O. Vice versa, if C stabilizes on value
x in the BDP for each assignment of opinions to the delegating agents in O,
then C has a guru whose opinion is x. This establishes a direct correspondence
between voting with delegable proxy and Boolean deGroot processes. However,
BDPs offer an interesting and novel angle on the issue of cyclical delegations,
to which we turn now.
4.2.5 Cycles
As discussed earlier (Section 3.2.1), cycles are a much discussed issue in liquid
democracy. Its proponents tend to dismiss delegation cycles as a non-issue:
since the agents forming a cycle delegate their votes, none of them is casting a
ballot and the cycles get resolved essentially by not counting the opinions of the
agents involved in the cycle [2]. We stressed this solution as problematic in the
‘vote-delegation’ interpretation of liquid democracy as it has the potential to
discard large numbers of opinions. The elimination of cycles not only hides to
aggregation the opinions of the agents involved in cycles, but also the opinions
of agents that may be linked to any of those agents by a delegation path. In
other words information about entire connected components in the delegation
graph may be lost.
We argue that the ‘vote-copying’ interpretation of the system—formalized
through BDPs—offers novel insights into possible approaches to cycles in del-
egable proxy. Theorems 3 and 6 offer an alternative solution by showing that
not all cycles are necessarily bad news for convergence: cycles in which all
agents agree still support convergence of opinions, and therefore a feasible ag-
gregation of opinions by proxy. This suggests that alternative proxy voting
mechanisms could be designed based on opinion convergence behavior rather
than on weighted voting.
4.3 Excursus: unanimity and 2-colorability
In the above, we have worked at the intersection of two models of opinion
diffusion, the DeGroot model, and the propositional opinion diffusion model.
However, there is more to say about how the two frameworks relate.
Let us take a brief detour towards a generalisation of BDPs corresponding to
the case of propositional opinion diffusion with the unanimity rule, where agents
can have several influencers and change their opinions only if all their influencers
disagree with them. This means that we relax the functionality constraint on
influence graphs. We will show how the two frameworks meet again: some non-
stabilizing opinion cases under the unanimity rule correspond to a special class
among the ‘semi-Boolean’ cases of DeGroot processes where opinions are still
binary but influence does not need to be.
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We define the dynamics of opinions under the unanimity rule in the obvious
way:
Definition 5 (UP). Fix an opinion profile O and a (serial but non-necessarily
functional) influence profile G. Consider the stream O0,O1, . . . ,On, . . . of opin-
ion profiles recursively defined as follows:
• Base: O0 := O
• Step: for all i ∈ N and all p ∈ P:
On+1i (p) =
{
Oni (p) if for some j, k ∈ Rp(i),Onj (p) 6= Onk (p)
Onj (p) otherwise, where j ∈ Rp(i) (9)
where Gp = 〈N,Rp〉. We call processes defined by the above dynamics Unanim-
ity Processes (UPs).
We give a sufficient condition for non-convergence of UPs:
Lemma 2. Let G be a (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profile
and O be an opinion profile, such that, for some p ∈ P, for all i, j ∈ C, where
C is a connected component of Gp: if i ∈ Rp(j), then Oi(p) 6= Oj(p). Then O
does not converge in UP.
Proof. Let G be a (serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profile, and
O be an opinion profile, such that, for some p ∈ P, for all i, j ∈ C with C
a connected component of Gp: if i ∈ Rp(j), then Oi(p) 6= Oj(p). Then, by
definition of UPs, for all i ∈ C, O1i (p) 6= Oi(p), and by repeating the same
argument, for all n ∈ N, On+1i (p) 6= Oni (p).
Intuitively, the above condition for non-convergence corresponds to a situ-
ation of global maximal disagreement: all agents (of a connected component)
disagree with all their influencers. Recall that a graph is properly k-colored if
each node is assigned exactly one among k colors and no node has a successor of
the same color, and consider the two possible opinions on issue p as colors. The
above result can be reformulated in terms of proper 2 colorings, as follows: if for
some p ∈ P, O properly colors Gp, then O does not converge. In such a case, all
agents will change their opinion on p at every step, entering an oscillation of size
2. So the maximal state of disagreement is the maximally unstable case of the
dynamics. Note that this limit case of opinion distribution is yet another special
case of DeGroot processes, another example within the intersection between the
two frameworks of propositional opinion diffusion and DeGroot.
The possibility of such a distribution of opinions on p relies on the influence
graph Gp being 2-colorable, which is again a requirement about the lengths of
its cycles: it is 2-colorable if and only if it contains no cycle of odd length.
However, non 2-colorability is not a sufficient condition for convergence of UPs
in general: a simple cycle of three agents, for instance, is not 2-colorable but
does not guarantee convergence either (as illustrated above with the convergence
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conditions for BDPs). Nevertheless, there is a class of influence profiles for
which being 2-colorable is a necessary condition of non-convergence of UPs, the
symmetric ones:
Lemma 3. Let G be a symmetric (serial and non-necessarily functional) influ-
ence profile and O be an opinion profile. The following statements are equiva-
lent:
1. O converges in UP on G;
2. For all p ∈ P, for all connected component C of Gp, there are i, j ∈ C,
such that i ∈ Rp(j), and Oi(p) = Oj(p), where Gp = 〈N,Rp〉.
Proof. 2)⇒ 1) Assume that for any p ∈ P, for any connected component C
of Gp, there exist i, j ∈ C, such that Rp(j) and Oi(p) = Oj(p). By definition of
UP, this implies that Oi(p) is stable, and that all agents with distance ≤ k will
be stable after at most k steps. 1)⇒ 2) This follows from Lemma 2.
This means that opinions on a given p will converge if and only if two agents
influencing each other on p already agree on it. We can therefore, as we did
for BDPs, characterize the class of influence profiles for which all (symmetric)
opinion profiles converge in UPs:
Theorem 4. Let G be a symmetric (serial and non-necessarily functional)
influence profile. The following statements are equivalent:
1. All opinion profiles O, converge in UPs on G.
2. For all p ∈ P, and all connected components of C ⊆ Gp, C is not 2-
colorable (contains cycle(s) of odd length), where Gp = 〈N,Rp〉.
Proof. 2)⇒ 1) Let p ∈ P and C be connected component of Gp with diameter
k. Let C contain a cycle of length c, with c odd. Let O be an arbitrary opinion
profile. Since c is odd, there exist i, j ∈ S such that j ∈ Rp(i) andOi(p) = Oj(p).
By definition of UP, this implies that Oi(p) is stable, and that all agents with
distance ≤ k will be stable after at most k steps. Hence, O converges. 1)⇒ 2)
This follows from Lemma 3.
Note that, while the basic modal language cannot capture graph 2-colorability,
it can capture non 2-colorability, and therefore capture the class of symmetric
(serial and non-necessarily functional) influence profiles which guarantee con-
vergence of UPs. We leave the detail out for space reason.
We have shown that, for UPs in general, convergence (in a connected com-
ponent) is not guaranteed if it contains no odd cycles, and that symmetric UPs
guarantee convergence as soon as they contain some odd cycle. However, con-
taining an odd cycle is a very “easy” requirement for a real-life influence network
to meet (it corresponds to a non-zero clustering coefficient). By contrast, re-
call that BDPs guarantee convergence (on any opinion profile) only when they
contain only cycles of size 1, which is a rather implausible requirement to be
satisfied on real influence networks.
25
4.4 BDPs on logically interdependent issues
So far we have assumed the aggregation to happen on a set of issues without
constraint (or rather with γ = >). In this subsection we study what happens
in the presence of a constraint γ 6= >. BDPs on aggregation structures with
constraints may lead individuals to update with logically inconsistent opinions.
But the diffusion perspective whereby agents copy the opinion of trustees rather
than delegating their voting right better lends itself to an assumption of indi-
vidual rationality.
The following processes are simple adaptations of BDPs where agents update
their opinions only if the opinions of their influencers, on the respective issues,
are consistent with the constraint.20
Definition 6. Fix an opinion profile O, an influence profile G, and a constraint
γ. Consider the stream O0,O1, . . . ,On, . . . of opinion profiles recursively defined
as follows:
• Base: O0 := O
• Step: for all i ∈ N , p ∈ P,
On+1i (p) :=
{
OnRp(i)(p) if
∧
p∈PO
n
Rp(i)
(p) ∧ γ is consistent
Oni (p) otherwise
where Gp = 〈N,Rp〉. We call processes defined by the above dynamics individ-
ually rational BDPs.
Individually rational BDPs converge in some cases in which BDPs do not.
There are cases in which there is disagreement in the cycles but the process still
converges, because of the safeguard towards individual rationality built into the
dynamics.
Example 6. Consider the following example. Let N = {1, 2}, P = {p, q} and
γ = {p ↔ ¬q}. Let then G = 〈N, {Ri}i∈P〉 be as follows: 1Rq1, 2Rq2, 1Rp2
and 2Rp1. Finally let O be such that O1(p) = O2(q) = 1, O2(p) = O1(q) = 0.
Voters 1 and 2 form a non-unanimous cycle, but O is a stable opinion profile.
The example shows that direction 1) ⇒ 2) of Theorem 3 does not hold for
individually rational BDPs: some individually rational BDPs may stabilize even
in the presence of disagreement within a cycle. Intuitively, the reason why this
happens is that individually rational BDPs that stabilize even when disagree-
ments occur within cycles do so because their cycles are not ”synchronized”.
In the above example, given the constraint p ↔ ¬q, the only way to get stabi-
lization starting from a situation respecting the constraint is to have a cycle of
influence for q which goes ‘in the opposite direction’ from the one from p, all
other cases would amount to violate the constraint.
20Other update policies are of course possible. A recent systematic investigation of opinion
diffusion on interconnected issues is [7].
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Beyond this simple example, we want to find out what happens with more
complex constraints and what are the conditions for individually rational BDPs
to converge. Let us first show that direction 2) ⇒ 1) of Theorem 3 still holds,
that is, individually rational BDPs without disagreement in their cycles always
converge:
Theorem 5. Let G be an influence profile, O be an opinion profile, and γ a con-
straint. Then the following holds: if for all p ∈ P, for all S ⊆ N such that S is a
cycle in Gp, and all i, j ∈ S: Oi(p) = Oj(p), then the individually rational BDP
for O, G and γ converges in at most k steps, where k ≤ max{diam(Gp)|p ∈ P}.
Proof. Assume that for all p ∈ P, for all S ⊆ N such that S is a cycle in
Gp, for all i, j ∈ S: Oi(p) = Oj(p). Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N . Let ki(p)
be the distance from i to the closest agent in a cycle of Gp, and let ki denote
max{ki(p)|p ∈ P}. We show that for any ki ∈ N, Okii is stable.
• If ki = 0: i is its only infuencer, therefore O0i is stable.
• If ki = n+ 1: Assume that for all agents j such that kj = n, O
kj
j is stable.
This implies that all influencers of i are stable. We need to consider the
following cases:
1. If
∧
p∈PO
m
Rp(i)
(p) ∧ γ is not consistent, then it will never be: Oni is
stable.
2. If
∧
p∈PO
m
Rp(i)
(p) ∧ γ is consistent, then On+1i is stable.
This completes the proof.
4.5 Section Summary
In this section we studied a very simple class of opinion diffusion processes on
networks (Boolean DeGroot processes, BDPs), which precisely capture the vote-
copying behavior suggested by a standard interpretation of the liquid democracy
system. Interestingly these processes lie at the interface of two so far uncon-
nected network diffusion models: the well-known DeGroot processes—of which
BDPs constitute the binary special case—and of propositional opinion diffusion
processes—of which BDPs constitute the special case where the set of neighbors
is a singleton. We established necessary and sufficient conditions for conver-
gence, which can be captured in modal fixpoint logics as we will show in the
next section. We argued that these results provide a novel angle on the issue of
delegation cycles in liquid democracy.
There are a number of further questions concerning, especially, individually
rational BDPs that we leave for future investigations: What are the necessary
conditions for their stabilization? What opinions are reachable? And, in par-
ticular, when is a consensus reached? Finally, one could consider other types of
influence policies than the one used in individually rational BDPs. For instance,
agents may be allowed to ‘pass through’ an inconsistent state at some point, in
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which case one can wonder under which conditions the process can still converge
to a consistent state. Indeterministic policies would also make sense, where an
agent confronted with inconsistent opinions from her influencers keeps one of
the closest consistent opinions set, rather than not being influenced at all (cf.
[7]).
5 Fixpoint Logics for BDPs
In this section we show how a well-established logic for formal verification can be
readily used to specify and reason about properties of BDPs, and in particular
their convergence. The logic is the so-called µ-calculus. This points to a so-far
unexplored interface between fixpoint logics and models of opinion dynamics—
like the DeGroot model and propositional opinion diffusion. The section moves
some first steps in that direction along the lines of another recent work [4],
where the mu-calculus, and extensions thereof, have been applied to the study
of dynamical systems.
5.1 Influence graphs as Kripke models
We treat influence graphs as Kripke (multi-relational) models [22, 8].
Definition 7. We call an influence model a tuple M = 〈N,G,O〉 where G =
(Gp1 , . . . , Gpm) is an influence profile, and O : P −→ 2N is an opinion profile
over P, that is, a valuation function.
One can therefore easily interpret a modal language over influence models,
where modalities are interpreted on the accessibility relations in G. That is,
to each graph Gp we associate modalities [p] and 〈p〉. We will give the details
below, but let us immediately note that the class of (possibly infinite) influence
graphs would then be characterized by the following properties, for any p ∈ P:
[p]ϕ→ 〈p〉ϕ (seriality) (10)
〈p〉ϕ→ [p]ϕ (functionality) (11)
More precisely, for any influence profile G = (Gp1 , . . . , Gpm), formula [pi]ϕ →
〈pi〉ϕ (respectively, 〈pi〉ϕ→ [pi]ϕ) is valid in such graph—that is, true in any
pointed influence model built on such graph—if and only if each Gpi consists
of a serial (respectively, functional) relation.21 Put otherwise, on serial and
functional graphs the modal box and diamond are equivalent.
5.2 Modal µ-calculus
Lµ : ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈p〉ϕ | µp.ϕ(p)
The language of the µ-calculus expands the basic modal language with a
least fixpoint operator µ. Here is the BNF of the language:
21These are known results from modal correspondence theory (cf. [5]).
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where p ranges over P and ϕ(p) indicates that p occurs free in ϕ (i.e., it is
not bounded by fixpoint operators) and under an even number of negations.22
In general, the notation ϕ(ψ) stands for ψ occurs in ϕ. The usual definitions for
Boolean and modal operators apply. Intuitively, µp.ϕ(p) denotes the smallest
formula p such that p↔ ϕ(p). The greatest fixpoint operator ν can be defined
from µ as follows: νp.ϕ(p) := ¬µp.¬ϕ(¬p).
We interpret Lµ on influence models as follows:
Definition 8. Let ϕ ∈ Lµ. The satisfaction of ϕ by a pointed influence model
(M, i) is inductively defined as follows:
M, i 6|= ⊥
M, i |= p ⇐⇒ i ∈ O(p), for p ∈ P
M, i |= ¬ϕ⇐⇒ i 6∈ ‖ϕ‖M
M, i |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇐⇒ i ∈ ‖ϕ1‖M ∩ ‖ϕ2‖M
M, i |= 〈p〉ϕ⇐⇒ i ∈ {j | ∃k : jGpk & k ∈ ‖ϕ‖M}
M, i |= µp.ϕ(p)⇐⇒ i ∈
⋂
{X ∈ 2N | ‖ϕ‖M[p:=X] ⊆ X}
where ‖ϕ‖M[p:=X] denotes the truth-set of ϕ once O(p) is set to be X. As usual,
we say that: ϕ is valid in a model M iff it is satisfied in all points of M, i.e.,
M |= ϕ; ϕ is valid in a class of models iff it is valid in all the models in the
class.
We list some relevant known results about Kµ. The logic has a sound and
(weakly) complete axiom system [28]. The satisfiability problem of Kµ is decid-
able [26]. The complexity of the model-checking problem for Kµ is known to be
in NP ∩ co-NP [19]. It is known that the model-checking problem for a formula
of size m and alternation depth d on a system of size n can be solved by the nat-
ural fixpoint-approximation algorithm with (time) complexity of O((m · n)d+1)
[12], where the alternation depth of a formula of Lµ is the maximum number
of µ/ν alternations in a chain of nested fixpoint subformulas.23 Finally, the µ-
calculus is known to be invariant for bisimulation (cf. [5]). It is actually known
to correspond to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of monadic second-order
logic [21].
5.3 On the logic of convergence in BDPs
Each stream of opinion profiles O0,O1, . . . ,On, . . . corresponds to a stream of
influence models M0,M1, . . . ,Mn, . . ..
From the point of view of an influence model M = 〈N,G,O〉 the BDP
dynamics of Definition 4 can therefore be recast in terms of updates of the
valuation function O as follows:
22This syntactic restriction guarantees that every formula ϕ(p) defines a set transformation
which preserves ⊆, which in turn guarantees the existence of least and greatest fixpoints by
the Knaster-Tarski fixpoint theorem (cf. [25]).
23The reader is referred to, e.g. [13], for the precise definition.
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• Base: O0 := O
• Step: On+1(p) := ‖[p] p‖Mn .
That is, the interpretation of p at step n+ 1 is the interpretation of [p] p at step
n. Equivalently, the interpretation of ¬p at step n + 1 is the interpretation of
[p]¬p at step n.
Lemma 4. Let M = 〈N,G,O〉 be an influence model. The two following
statements are equivalent:
1. i ∈ N is stable for p;
2. The pointed model (M, i) satisfies:24
stb(p) := νx.± p ∧ [p]x (12)
Proof. First of all observe that, by the semantics of the µ-calculus, formula
stb(p) denotes the largest fixpoint of function ±p∧[p] (·), that is, formula [p∗]±p
where [p∗] is the modal box interpreted over the reflexive and transitive closure of
Gp. 1)⇒ 2) Assume that i is stable for p and suppose towards a contradiction
thatM, i 6|= stb(p). By what said above, it follows that there exists a j such that
Oi(p) 6= Oj(p) which is connected by a finite Gp path to i. By the functionality
of influence models and the dynamics of Definition 4 then at some stage n in
the stream of opinion profiles it should hold that Oni (p) = Oj(p), against the
assumption that i be stable for p. 2)⇒ 1) Assume M, i |= stb(p). By what
said above, this implies that there exists no j such that Oi(p) 6= Oj(p) which is
connected by a finite Gp path to i. It follows that in the stream generated by
the BDP dynamics i cannot change its opinion, and hence it is stable.
Theorem 6. Let M = 〈N,G,O〉 be an influence model. The two following
statements are equivalent:
1. i ∈ N stabilizes for issue p ∈ P;
2. The pointed model (M, i) satisfies:
µx.stb(p) ∨ [p]x (13)
Proof. First of all observe that, by the semantics of the µ-calculus µx.stb(p) ∨
[p]x denotes the smallest fixpoint of equation x↔ stb(p)∨[p]x. By the Knaster-
Tarski theorem and the fact that influence models are finite, we can compute
such fixpoint as
⋃
0≤n<ω‖stb(p)n‖ where ‖stb(p)0‖ = ‖stb(p) ∨ [p]⊥‖ (notice
that [p]⊥ ↔ ⊥ on influence models) and ‖stb(p)n+1‖ = ‖stb(p) ∨ [p] stb(p)n‖.
So, by Lemma 4 i belongs to ‖µx.stb(p)∨[p]x‖ either i is stable for issue p or has
24Notice that ±p is used as a variable ranging over {p,¬p}. Technically the above formula
is to be read as a scheme for νx.p ∧ [p]x and νx.± ¬p ∧ [p]x.
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access in a finite number of steps to a an agent who is stable for p. 1)⇒ 2)
Assume that i stabilizes for issue p ∈ P. So there exists a stage n in the
stream of profiles generated through Definition 4 at which Oni (p) = O
m
i (p) for
all m > n. By Lemma 4, 〈N,G,On〉 , i |= stb(p). It follows that i is connected
through a finite Gp-path to an agent j such that M, j |= stb(p). By what
established above we thus have thatM, i |= µx.stb(p)∨ [p]x. 2)⇒ 1) Assume
M, i |= µx.stb(p)∨ [p]x. It follows that i is connected through a finite Gp-path
to an agent j such that M, j |= stb(p). By Lemma 4 j is therefore stable and
therefore i will stabilize for p.
So the formula that expresses the stabilization of the agents’ opinions on
one issue is µx. (νy.± p ∧ [p] y) ∨ [p]x. Informally, the theorem states that in a
BDP an agent reaches a stable opinion if and only if it has an indirect influencer
(linked by an influence path) whose all direct and indirect influencer have the
same opinion. Notice that such formula has alternation depth 0. So an off-the-
shelf model-checking algorithm for the µ-calculus can check stabilization in time
O(m · n) with n being the size of the model and m the size of the formula.
Now confront this with the earlier Theorem 6. Since the convergence of the
BDP is equivalent to the stabilization of all agents on all issues p (either on p
or ¬p), we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The BDP for an opinion profile O based on influence graph G
converges if and only if
〈N,G,O〉 , i |= U
∧
p∈P
µx.stb(p) ∨ [p]x
 (14)
for any agent i ∈ N , where U denotes the universal modality (cf. [5]).
So the above formula characterizes the property of convergence for a BDP.
Since the process of voting in a liquid democracy system can be modeled by a
BDP, the formula also characterizes precisely when voting by delegable proxy
results in a 1 or 0 opinion on a given issue.
6 Conclusions
The paper has moved the first steps towards the development of theoretical
foundations for the voting system of liquid democracy based on delegable proxy.
We have pursued two lines of research linked to two interpretations com-
monly associated to the proxy character of liquid democracy: the delegation of
voting right to trustees, vs. the copying of the votes of influencers. The first
interpretation has led us to develop a simple model of liquid democracy based
on the theory of binary and judgment aggregation. This has allowed us to study
liquid democracy as a form of binary aggregation with abstentions. The second
interpretation has led us to study liquid democracy through extremely simple
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models of opinion diffusion corresponding to the Boolean special case of the
stochastic processes of opinion diffusion known as DeGroot processes. We have
argued that studying aggregation in liquid democracy through this lens offers
important advantages with respect to the handling of delegation cycles and the
preservation of individual rationality. Through this second perspective we have
also shown how off-the-shelf logical techniques can be used to analyze properties
(such as convergence) of the diffusion process underpinning liquid democracy.
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A Binary aggregation (without abstention)
The formalism of choice for this paper is binary aggregation [14]. A binary
aggregation structure (BA structure) is a tuple A = 〈N,P, γ〉 where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set individuals s.t. |N | = n ∈ N;
• P = {p1, . . . , pm} is a finite set of issues (|P| = m ∈ N), each represented
by a propositional atom;
• γ ∈ L is an (integrity) constraint, where L is the propositional language
constructed by closing P under a functionally complete set of Boolean
connectives (e.g., {¬,∧})
An opinion O : P → {0,1} is an assignment of truth values to the set
of issues P, and the set of all opinions is denoted by O. The opinion of an
agent i is said to be “consistent” whenever Oi |= γ, that is, i’s opinion sat-
isfies the integrity constraint. The set of all consistent opinions is denoted
Oc = {O ∈ O | O |= γ}. Thus, O(p) = 0 (respectively, O(p) = 1) indicates that
opinion O rejects (respectively, accepts) the issue p. Syntactically, the two opin-
ions correspond to the truth of the literals p or ¬p. For p ∈ P we write ±p to
denote one element from {p,¬p}. An opinion profile O = (O1, . . . , On) records
the opinion, on the given set of issues, of every individual in N . Given a profile
O the ith projection O is denoted Oi (i.e., the opinion of agent i in profile O).
We also denote by O(p) = {i ∈ N | Oi(p) = 1} the set of agents accepting issue
p in profile O and by O(p−) = {i ∈ N | Oi(p) = 0}.
Given a BA structure A, an aggregation rule (or aggregator) for A is a
function F : (Oc)N → O, mapping every profile of consistent opinions to one
collective opinion in O. F (O)(p) denotes the outcome of the aggregation on
issue p. A benchmark aggregator is issue-by-issue strict majority rule (maj),
which accepts an issue if and only if the majority of the population accepts it:
maj(O)(p) = 1⇐⇒ |O(p)| ≥ |N |+ 1
2
. (15)
It is well-known that aggregation by majority does not preserve consistency.
The standard example is provided by the discursive dilemma, represented by
the BA structure 〈{1, 2, 3} , {p, q, r} , r ↔ p ∧ q〉. The profile consisting of O1 |=
p∧ q ∧ r, O2 |= p∧¬q ∧¬r, O3 |= ¬p∧ q ∧¬r, returns an inconsistent majority
opinion maj(O) |= p ∧ q ∧ ¬r.
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B Relevant terminology from graph theory
Let G = 〈N,R〉 be a graph and R∗ be the transitive and symmetric closure of
R. A path is a sequence of nodes 〈i1, . . . , ik〉, such that, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k},
ilRil+1. The distance between two nodes i, j is the length of the shortest path
〈i, . . . , j〉 between them. The diameter of a graph is the maximal distance
between any two nodes related by a path. A cycle is a path of length k such
that i1 = ik. A set of nodes S ⊆ N is said to be:
a cycle in G if all elements in S are in one cycle of length |S|,
connected if for any i, j ∈ S: iR∗j,
strongly connected if for any i, j ∈ S: there is a path 〈i, . . . , j〉,
closed if for any i ∈ S, j /∈ S, it is not the case that iRj,
a connected component if for any i, j ∈ N : iR∗j if and only if i, j ∈ S,
aperiodic if the greatest common divisor of the lengths of its cycles is 1.
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